As the father of German and international revisionism -what we would now call either democratic socialism or social democracy -Eduard Bernstein has attracted, and continues to attract, a great deal of attention among historians and political scientists. Yet much of this attention remains unduly narrow in focus, leaving large areas of the whole Bernstein, and of the revisionist phenomenon, either partially or completely unexplored. This gap is particularly obtrusive in respect of Bernstein's treatment of issues arising from his abiding preoccupation with international relations, and more particularly with Anglo-German relations 1 . Bernstein's pre-1914 ap-proach to the problems of war, militarism and the arms race is one such desideratum meriting closer investigation both by virtue of its bearing on Bernstein's own intellectual development -his wartime pacifism has often been noted but never explained in the context of his pre-war attitudes or of his revisionism -and by dint of the light which it may be able to shed on the nature of German revisionism qua political movement.
The third determinant of Bernstein's attitude towards war was his susceptibility to the arguments of Social Darwinism. A legacy of Marx and Engels as well as of British liberalism (conveyed mainly through the Liberal Imperialists and the Fabians) n , Social
Darwinism represented an ambivalent influence which Bernstein never entirely eradicated from his thought. Throughout the nineties and beyond, his writings were liberally larded with such statements as »to grow in strength is to live, to stand still is death« 12 , and in July 1913 he remained proud of the bonds linking socialism with Darwinism 13 . To be sure, his interpretation of Darwinism emphatically rejected all attempts to enlist its arguments on the side of reactionary class, race and economic theories 14 . His application of this school of thought to international relations must, however, disqualify him as a pacifist in the absolute sense. Relying on a variety of sources, from Grotius to Marx, Engels and Lassalle, he condoned violence in general (»there has always been violence and coercion in the world«, he wrote in 1900) 15 and appealed to an »ethical right of the stronger« in defence of colonial wars in particular 16 .
Where he drew the line at the progressive and morally acceptable function of struggle and violence was the prospect of armed conflict among the Great Powers 17 . Believing that no progressive purpose could be served by a war among two or more Great Powers (and he was convinced that any European war would certainly involve all the Great Powers, in consequence of the alliance system) in that the likely material and social destruction would far outweigh any conceivable economic or other advantages that might accrue to the victors, Bernstein consistently opposed, in the name of progress and humanity, each and every force that threatened to issue in such a calamity for civilization 18 . Only when the Agadir crisis brought home to him the stark reality of the danger that Armageddon might well arise from a minor dispute among lesser nations or over colonial matters, only then did he begin to adopt a more sophisticated interpretation of the struggle for existence and argue, as Hobson had done in 1902 19 , that such struggle could be sublimated in non-belligerent forms of rivalry 20 .
Before 1914 Bernstein did not offer any coherent analysis of the causes of war or the appropriate remedies thereto. This, however, is not to say that the germs of his wartime analysis cannot already be discerned in his pre-war writings and speeches. If he did not have a fully developed theory of war before 1914, he nevertheless expressed a viewpoint on the subject, and did so at times most forcefully, if not always with faultless consistency. On the whole, he tended to lay heavy emphasis on such ideological and psychological factors as nationalism, protectionism and war hysteria as the primary threats to the peace of Europe. When he told his English readers in 1910 that »today nationalism has in Germany but one meaning -Jingoism« 21 , he was expressing his conviction that the German bourgeoisie had gone over en masse to reactionary chauvinism and that such nationalism had become inseparable from navalism, militarism, colonial greed, autarkic protectionism and rabid Anglophobia 22 . Although he could not but recognize chauvinistic nationalism as a threat to peace, he yet continued to describe it as a mere »passing fad« cherished by »a contemptible minority of the nation« 23 , which minority he nevertheless went on to identify as financiers, pro- Among the material causes of war identified by Bernstein in the pre-war era, the one which he most strongly detested was probably the prevailing system of international relations. This he condemned either as »cabinet politics« or Staatenpolitik, and his principal objection was that the existing system was incapable of guaranteeing a lasting peace because it was founded on interests and powers rather than on the will of the peoples. In the Reichstag during the last two and a half years of peace he was most vociferous on the subject. Although, as indicated, he often used both terms interchangeably, Bernstein tended to speak more commonly of the arms race. Again he was more explicit on effects than on causes and definition, and he was generally more concerned with bulk, cost and the navy than with technical matters or the army. Again there is a noticeable ambivalence in his approach to the problem. On the one hand, he complained of how deeply the arms race -on land, at sea and in the air -had become embedded in the popular consciousness of the nation and of the breadth and depth of support for chauvinistic war-mongering in German society 50 . Without reservation, he repeatedly condemned Germany as the nation which had initiated and accelerated the arms race while consistently foiling all attempts at disarmament 51 . On the other hand, he persisted in seeing the most hopeful indicators of imminent arms reductions and speedy progress towards general disarmament. He was particularly impressed by the fact that Friedrich Naumann, one of the earliest and most enthusiastic supporters of the Tirpitz fleet, should have come to favour an Anglo-German naval agreement by 1910 52 . Begun by Germany, the arms race had acquired a momentum of its own 53 . It was bankrupting rich states, oppressing whole classes, hindering social progress, damaging world trade, manufacturing international tension, sustaining a cold war situation, and must soon lead to an explosion 54 : »If political conditions remain as they are«, he wrote in June 1908, »it seems quite unthinkable that the increase of the burdens of armaments can go on much longer without driving the nations to the desperate attempt of making an end of it all by means of a war.«
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In general, it may be said of Bernstein's treatment of the causes of war that his approach was, especially in the pre-war period, superficial, empirical and bourgeois radical rather than Marxist. Lacking in depth, full of inconsistencies and antinomies, his analysis hardly took the problem of war seriously before 1911 at the earliest. The causes of war which he identified were treated as being systemic in nature principally insofar as they could be labelled as residual feudalism. Nationalism, protectionism, Machtpolitik and militarism were commonly regarded as being essentially artificial and optional forces, such as could readily be modified or reversed by a change of heart or policy -as no more than the products of misconceived sectional interests, wicked sensationalist journalism or the machinations of misguided minorities. It is highly significant that after 1911 he worked very closely with non-socialist pacifists like Fried and Angeli, for his attitude was not only glaringly un-Marxist but barely even socialist, except perhaps in the eclectic tradition of English ethical socialism which he had come to admire greatly in the course of his London exile 56 .
It is entirely characteristic of Bernstein that whatever the deficiencies in his analysis of the causes of war, he was still much more profuse and profound on this subject than he was in proposing remedies to combat the menace of war. Here his other shortcomings were compounded by a strong measure of that ambivalence which typified so much of his thought. Unlike the centre-orthodoxy, which was fatalistic regarding the ultimate objective or Endziel and indifferent to short-term or immediate activity, except insofar as the latter bore directly on the final attainment of socialism, Bernstein's revisionism was pessimistic in respect of the socialist Endziel and highly voluntarist in short-term or day-to-day politics. To Bernstein, socialism was an abstract and only incompletely realizable ideal towards which society would and should gradually approximate. Since it encompassed a large measure of ethical Wollen or desire, it was not something to be awaited with folded arms but had to be actively worked for and earned 57 . In matters of war and peace, this order was reversed. Confident that history was already creating, through the internationalization of commerce 58 and the growth of the proletariat 59 , the groundwork of a firm body of international law and a supranational political structure in place of anarchic power politics and Staatenpolitik 60 ,
Bernstein allowed his optimistic Enlightenment progressivism and his German patriotism to persuade him that there was little scope or reason for radical peace action in the short term. Thus he insisted that the struggle for peace had to be waged not internationally but at the national level, with the peace forces in each country fighting »to settle with their own domestic disturbers of the peace« 61 . It had also to be fought in the name of justice, which was to be the touchstone of international relations in place of the hitherto prevailing concept of power 62 . Bernstein's pre-1914 peace programme therefore contained two elements. On the one hand, he demanded greater respect for international law and the creation of a league of civilized nations 63 . Because he perceived the ineluctable march of history already moving in this direction, he merely confined himself to putting on record his support for such long-term, self-realizing objectives. On the other hand, he felt that the cause of peace could best be served in the short run by the forces for peace -and that, in Imperial Germany, meant almost exclusively Social Democracy 64 -waging an incessantly active campaign on behalf of free trade and the widest possible application of the democratic principle 65 . In the belief that peoples cherished nothing so highly as peace 66 , that states founded on the popular will rather than on the prerogatives of tyrants or classes would necessarily give concrete expression to their love of peace 67 , and that democracy was both the method and the substance of socialism 68 , he reduced his pacifism very largely to a call for more democracy as the one certain antidote to virtually all the evils associated with militarism -to chauvinism, protectionism, the fatalistic legend of inevitable war, power politics and the arms race
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. The notion, popular among radical and orthodox Marxists, that lasting peace could be achieved only in the wake of socialist revolution, was therefore quite alien to Bernstein's pre-war thinking.
The ambivalent quality of his pacifism may be further illustrated by reference to three specific concessions which he made to militarism. One was his insistence on the duty of Social Democrats to participate in national defence 70 . In itself, this was innocuous enough. The Erfurt Programme acknowledged such a duty, and numerous party spokesmen, including Wilhelm Liebknecht, Ignaz Auer, Georg v. Vollmar and August Bebel, had repeatedly done the same 71 . But the manner in which Bernstein presented his case detracted considerably from the credibility of his anti-militarism. Arguing that the proletariat did indeed have a stake in the undemocratic Reich, which was not simply a reality to be accommodated, »but as an all-embracing civil community, something that is most precious« 72 , he informed the German workers that as citizens and as the historical heirs of capitalism they were in duty bound to uphold the present and future national interests of the nation, especially against tsarist Russia, which was infinitely more militaristic, uncivilized and aggressive than the Prusso-German exercise restraint in attacking the excesses of their own government, lest they give aid and comfort to a foreign power, while at the same time reminding foreign comrades of their duty to pull no punches in settling accounts with their own disturbers of the peace, naturally struck contemporary orthodox and radical Marxists as both oneeyed and the extremity of folly 91 . And so it was. Bernstein's attitude can be explained by reference to such factors as his patriotism, his Russophobia and his optimism regarding the outlook for peace, but no amount of explanation can alter the fact that the principal, indeed the sole weapon he offered Social Democracy in its fight against the menace of global war was a mere pious hope that bourgeois allies could be found in time to facilitate the realization of true parliamentary government in the Reich before domestic or external catastrophe intervened in the form of a revolution from above or the so widely discussed coming war.
Bernstein's third concession to militarism was his approval of colonial wars, which he derived from his recognition of the urge to grow and expand as a natural and healthy one, inherent in nations as in individuals 92 . Citing Marx in support of his position, he contended that »savages« had »only a conditional right to the land they occupied« and none whatever to block or delay the onward march of civilization, in whose name European nations had a right and a duty to impose their will, by force if necessary, on »lower« or »backward« civilizations, provided this was done without undue brutality 93 99 and that almost any war could easily turn the European cold war into a general disaster for civilization and progress 10°, and for other reasons as well, from this point onwards he found nothing positive to say about colonial conflict of any kind. But his volte-face came too late. For more than a decade he had condoned and lauded colonial war as a civilizing mission, and it was this that registered with friend and foe alike. Much as he personally might deplore such an inference, Bernstein's essentially culturally based distinction between civilized and »backward« peoples could be extended to accommodate an exclusive and chauvinistic German nationalism. Mere Praktiker like Gustav Noske were infinitely less discriminating. In fact, the pre-war Reichstag speeches of Noske in particular were full of examples of blatantly racist »national egoism« 101 , and it is hard to believe that such people were not at least partly influenced by Bernstein's example. When in 1913 the SPD Reichstag Fraktion voted in favour of the supply bill covering the largest army increase in the history of Imperial Germany, and so departed from the party's former principle of »to this system, not a man and not a penny«, Bernstein remained consistent enough to vote in the party caucus against the supply bill 102 . Yet his own record of consistently ambivalent anti-militarism was at least partly responsible for this »decisive step along the path to military revisionism« 103 .
Bernstein's wartime pacifist internationalism was therefore much more than a product of his concern for truth 104 . It had been present, at least in embryonic form, at the birth of his revisionism and earlier. Its most striking feature was its eclecticism, embracing, as it did, elements not only from Marx, Engels and Lassalle, but still more from Enlightenment progressivism and classical liberalism, together with selective borrowings from Darwinism, positivism, Fabianism, British ethical socialism and his own liberal Jewish background. On the whole, the liberal imprest exceeded his indebtedness to Marx or even to Engels. Like the »general«, Bernstein focussed primarily on the preservation of peace among the Great Powers and refused to consider war as an expedient or catalyst to some other, more desirable end such as socialist revolution. What he also shared with his London mentor was a tendency to treat war as a relatively independent variable in human affairs, and certainly as much more than the military tail of the economic dog. In the area of military affairs in particular, there is a case to be made for the proposition that the first revisionist was not Bernstein but the later Engels 105 . Yet it would be misleading to attribute to Engels more than partial responsibility for the genesis of Bernstein's military revisionism. There were, in fact, several important differences between the »general« and his subaltern. For one, Engels remained a revolutionary, whereas Bernstein abandoned entirely the revolutionary road to socialism. Secondly, Engels' strategic thought in the last ten years of his life was dominated by his fear of an imminent European great war, whereas Bernstein was unable to take the problem seriously until the Agadir crisis, when in fright he began to seek solace by adopting elements of the atavistic Hobson-Hilferding-Lenin thesis that Engels had renounced as defective. Since Bernstein and Kautsky had both learnt their Marxist ABC at the feet of Engels, it is not surprising that Bernstein's position was, if by no means »indistinguishable« from, then certainly »quite close« to that of Karl Kautsky in the last years of peace 106 , for the two old friends and comrades again drew closer to each other after 1912. Apart from the humanistic values clearly underpinning their respective attitudes, they now shared an essentially political rather than economic approach to the problem of war, a refusal to accept war as inevitable or militarism and the arms race as anything other than the »mistaken« policies of minorities, a pessimism regarding the ability of the party to prevent or terminate a war by means of strike action, a willingness to co-operate with bourgeois pacifists to oppose war and the arms race, an insistence that such a struggle could only be waged at the national level, and a faith in the efficacy of democratization and propaganda as the appropriate weapons in the fight for peace.
Contemplation of Bernstein's pre-war approach to the problem of militarism suggests that on this issue, at least, Bernstein's personal position was of marginal importance to revisionism, considered either as a movement or as a school of thought. With centrist spokesmen like Kautsky he shared a large measure of common ground, despite their surface antipathies. Their apparent differences were more a matter of semantic than of substantive divergence, reflecting the time lag inherent in the fact that Kautsky still reasoned, or believed himself to be still reasoning, in Marxist categories that Bernstein had long ago abandoned. Stand this paradox on its head and we have the nub of Bernstein's relations with his nominal allies and followers in the revisionist camp. Although his free-trade, Anglophile liberal internationalism stood in marked contrast to the protectionist, Anglophobe illiberal nationalism of Joseph Bloch, Karl Leuthner and the Sozialistische Monatshefte generally, many contemporaries (from Lenin to Siidekum and Ernest Belfort Bax) failed to detect any significant difference between Bernsteinian and other revisionism. The tenor of Bernstein's pre-1914 pacifism offers some corroboration of this view, for it reveals his ambivalence and equivocation as rendering him open to interpretation as a »fellow-traveller« of Bloch and demonstrates that on several important points Bernstein made major concessions to social chauvinism which seriously called into question his own credibility both as an antimilitarist and as an internationalist. Revisionism was, of course, much more than an intellectual trend, but when considered as an ideological phenomenon -and here Bernstein's claims to paternity are strongest -it can be said of Bernstein's personal contribution that it must be neither inflated as to its profundity and impact nor truncated in relation to its range and breadth.
See , 1900 . In Canadian Journal of History 13 (1978 , 1892 , . Princeton, N.J. 1975 
